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Abstract 
This acticle analyzes how presumption of innocence principle can mediate between individualistic-liberalistic 
and human rights concept containing in second principle of Pancasila. Criticism on individualistic aspect 
underlying protection of human right from the evil doer (offender-based protection), and ignoring social justice 
of people who suffer loss from crimes is a focus of the writing, and a hot issue in Indonesia nowadays. 
Introductory review indicated that presumption of innocence in legislation is not placing equal protection for 
both legal subjects, namely, offender and victim so that a sustained dialectic reaction on the importance of 
“Human Right and Obligation” concept is emerged. However, do Indonesian cultural and social roots want this 
unbalanced protection of human rights? It is a question need to criticize considering implementation of 
presumption of innocence. When historical records were traced, actually second principle of Pancasila describes 
the desired historical human right records, namely, a civilized and just humanity, and not a liberal individual one. 
Examination of the presumption of innocence principle in an autonomic law thought viewed as a product of 
regulation that is a good source for power legitimation, is tried to re-question. Historical reality root of the 
autonomic regulation, in this case, is viewed narrowly as instrument of social control should be found. 
Ultimately, the criticism found that the individualistic-liberalistic presumption of innocence was not suitable 
with social justice theory, the human rights concept containing in second principle of Pancasila, in Preamble of 
1954 Constitution and in articles of the 1945 Constitution. 
Keywords: Pancasila, human right, social justice. 
 
1. Introduction 
Observing the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR,1966), primarily on 
Article 14 Paragraph 2, a formulation of the presumption-of-innocence principle can be found mentioning that 
"everyone charged with a criminal offense shall have the right to be innocent until proved guilty Presumed 
According to law". However, the formulation of presumption-of-innocence principle is presumably having an 
essential difference when it is compared with the formulation of words in Article 8 of the Judicial Power Law 
and the General Explanation of the Criminal Procedure Law, that: "Any person who is suspected, arrested, 
detained, prosecuted, and/or exposed before the court shall be deemed not guilty before a verdict of the court 
declaring his or her guilt is released, and it has gained a fixed legal force " (The Criminal Procedure Law 
8/1981). 
Based on both formulations of the presumption-of-innocence principle mentioned above, it can be seen 
that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights only asserted that the person should be considered 
innocent until proven under the law. Conception of the presumption-of-innocence in the covenant above did not 
require any existence of a verdict with a fixed legal power as a tolerance limit about whether a person may be 
found guilty. That is a decision of first-level judge based on very strong evidence will be enough to put an end to 
the presumption of innocence for an offender who had sentenced as guilty, even though the offender can still to 
take legal actions (Atmasasmita, 2011). In this case, it should be seen that the proving a person’s guiltiness is 
based on Common Law, confirmed by the phrase, "proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt". Such phrase 
means "(Declared) guilty based on very strong evidence or there is no doubt at all". Thus, such conception of the 
principle is very different when compared with formulation of the phrase, "(Declared) guilty based on a verdict 
having a fixed legal force (Atmasasmita, 2011), as described in general explanation of the Criminal Law and the 
Judicial Power Law. 
Considering the contradictory conditions, a legal hole that may appear later and lead into a debate is: 
how does the existence of presumption of innocence provide certainty, fairness and usefulness of the law if 
viewed from the necessity that a trial should be performed quickly, simple and at low cost, as well as freely, 
truthfully and unbiased at every judicial level consequently? Is such very protective conception of human rights 
for criminals preferred by Pancasila? Such dilemmatic condition thus, increasingly counter-productive when it 
faces a white collar crime (Mustofa, 2010), such as corruption. On one hand, the 'legal effort' perpetuates the 
existence of the presumption of innocence and put importance of legal certainty of the suspected-of-crime 
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individual, while at the same time a fast justice which bring a legal purpose of Gustav Radbruch is in fact, 
intended to negate and reject the protracted length of time of a judicial process. 
Therefore, with this paper, author focuses on the study of legal substances reorientation of the 
presumption of innocence which is considered more concerned with 'legal certainty' and 'procedural fairness' 
characterized by liberal individualist (Arief, 2009). Meanwhile, the presumption of innocence principle is also 
tried to test against Pancasila, because its individualist characteristic is considered hurting the ‘sense of justice' 
of the wider community because of ‘long idle time' is allowed until a verdict with a fixed legal power reached 
the offense perpetrator including the corruption crime. 
Based on the background exposed above, a problem formulation which used as a study is; how to 
reform legal substance of the just and civilized humanity-based to the presumption-of-innocence principle with 
its liberal individualistic character? 
 
2. Discussion 
Questioning the 'presumption-of-innocence' principle in intertwined pathways of law enforcement is in fact, 
encountering a relationship between interests of the suspected-of-crime individual for ‘certainty’ versus interest 
of a wider community as the victim. It can be read, that: "Any person who is suspected, arrested, detained, 
prosecuted, and/or exposed before the court shall be deemed not guilty before a verdict of the court declaring his 
or her guilt is released, and it has gained a fixed legal force ". 
If the sound of such text is observed carefully, it is seen that position of the suspected or accused 
person was superior compared the victim’s opposing position.  Moreover, the victim is not mentioned, although 
it is clear that the victim had suffered from criminal offense of the perpetrator, and the crime is eventually 
causing the perpetrator to be subjected to forceful measures (arrest, detention, and so on). A next point showing 
privileges of the offense perpetrator is periodicity of the 'presumed innocent' status putting the 'legal remedy' 
(appeals, cassation, judicial review, and so on) as 'a very long pause of justice' until it is legally binding. 
Compare the long pause of determining the guilty status with instantaneous consequences of the criminal act 
afflicting the victims. For example, Court Decision No. 34/ PUU-XI/2013 states that rule determines that review 
can be proposed only once Article 268, paragraph (3), Criminal Code) is contradicted with the 1945 Constitution 
Petition filed by Antasari Azhar and read on Thursday, 6 March 2014, opening even a longer path of legal effort. 
Moreover, a review may be filed many times as long as there are underlying novum. 
Under conditions of the binary opposition, privileged periodization, and the need for a new idea of the 
presumption of innocence, so the following will explain more about reform of legal substance towards 
implementation of the principle. At a later stage, implementation of law enforcement of the presumption of 
innocence principle carrying the conception of Human Rights will be tried to reform with the principle of just 
and civilized humanity in law enforcement. 
 
2.1 Legal Substance Reform of the Individualistic-Liberal Presumption of Innocence. 
In a legal thought of Criminal Law, the principle of innocence presumption is seen as a product of rule as a 
dependable source for legitimizing the power of law enforcement (Nonet & Selznick, 2013). When the 
presumption of innocence is seen as the product of legislation, then the legislation becomes a standard to judge 
whether an act which had been committed by the suspected person can be said to be guilty, or it cannot be said as 
guilty yet. The set of text in such legislation has a meaning with an undeniable truth (Asshiddiqie & Safa’at, 
2012; Kelsen, 1961). For the positivistic, legalistic, or dogmatic view of law, texts of legislation contain virtues 
derived from hypothetical truth as explained by (Kelsen, 2013) and Adolf Merkl, especially in Stufenbau Theorie 
(Asshiddiqie & Safa’at, 2012; Jeliæ, 1998). Based on such thinking, every meaning of the presumption-of-
innocence principle is what the texts of law call as artificial reasons that become the position foundation of a 
person may be found as guilty (Nonet & Selznick, 2013). At a later stage, the law enforcement which executed 
by either the police, prosecutor, and judge and lawyer, will be work on the case, check it, interpret it, and make a 
verdict by the existing meaning or statutory texts. In this case, the rule is considered narrowly as a means of 
social control. 
However, centralization of the texts as noted earlier needs to get a touch of substantial reform of the 
law, that the rules or laws are often marginalizing certain groups within society. For example, in the context of a 
criminal act, the 'presumption-of-innocence’ principle which is very protecting the 'rule of law' of a suspect’s and 
defendant’s human rights with its individualistic characteristic has been directly marginalize the 'justice' for 
victim in the regulation content. The victim, in the context of community groups who is actually an affected 
party of the offender's criminal offense, does not receive a positive portion because it has been myth that his or 
her interest is already represented by law enforcement officials in criminal justice process (Rahardjo, 2009). The 
unequal picture is agreeing with the views of Nonet and Selznick that 'legislation often unwittingly becomes a 
hidden enemy' (Nonet & Selznick, 1978). This view is principally rejecting the value-oriented explanations and 
directs it to the aspects that can be measured from the subject matter in an attempt of finding a causal 
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When text is formalized, then it will be bound by linguistic standards as a system with legitimization, 
the text loses its sound. Thus, the text is only having a single meaning and, ultimately, the meaning will support 
the power with its legitimacy, even the text turns into the power itself. At this stage, pluralistic meaning of the 
text is destroyed by power itself. There is no other meaning than the formalized one (Nonet & Selznick, 2013). 
Legal view separating and detaching law of individual’s human rights and law of community’s one 
based on the rules as explained above is also referred to as a perspective of mechanical jurisprudence of the-
presumption-of-innocence principle with a very narrow scope of discretion. Furthermore, criticism of a text 
structure with its binary-opposition characteristic according to Derrida can also be used (Indarti, 2002). In this 
case, existence of 'presumption-of-innocence' textually is encountered to the 'presumption-of-guilt'. 
Consequently, within such binary area, relationship of 'presumption-of-innocence' to 'presumption of guilt' only 
be white-black, right-wrong, good-bad with the first word is usually significantly superior to the next. 
The need for substantial reform of the law regarding the inability of implementation of presumption-
of-innocence principle out of the binary opposition by law enforcers which refer to textual is actually showing 
the main characteristic of the rule-of-law model. In interpreting and implementing the law, many legal experts in 
the textual law condition are just becoming objective spokesmen for the principles that have been established 
historically. Law enforcers simply become the giver of justice impersonally and have been accepted as 
something standard. They have a claim to the last word because their decisions are believed as something to 
obey external interest and not their own will. Consequently, a historical bargain occurs in which legal institutions 
acquire procedural autonomy with the condition of sacrificing autonomy of substances (Nonet & Selznick, 2013). 
If the criticism is reviewed from the side of principle interpreter that is coming from the party who 
wants the presumption-of-innocence principle implemented as an sich textual legal product, then the position of 
principle interpreter is actually as a complement only. Position of law enforcers as interpreter simply fulfills the 
meaning of formal, single and established. Thus, there is only certainty of the meaning of the text as a 
characteristic of formalism, not substantive. As a result, production of meaning is closed, and hidden reality (i.e., 
what is underlying the emergence of a principle), is difficult to uncover. This is one of evidence about how 
uncreative the law enforcers as interpreters because of confined by logocentrism (Sobur, 2003; Grenz, 2001; 
Susanto, 2010), so the text loses its progressive meaning. At the same time, the interpreter does not understand 
that the text is a trap and a prison for those who consider that it has an absolute meaning. At further stage, the 
interpreter is no longer able to escape from the confines of formal meanings. 
 
2.2 Towards the Value of Just and Civilized Humanity: A Critique by Dismantling the Meaning 
Interpretation of the Presumption-of-Innocence Principle 
One of the criticisms expressed to the textual view of law is through analysis of critical theory over the 
presumption-of-innocence principle which, of course, would indicate a new different meaning. By dismantling 
this principle, a criticism against the meaning of presumption-of-innocence occurs. This principle is no longer 
viewed as a product, but it is seen as a process which positioning a certain set of people and actions designated 
as the implementation of the presumption-of-innocence principle on the certain 'time and place' (Jaya, 2013). It 
means that through the dismantling, the presumption-of-innocence principle is seen not merely as behaviors of 
people who are defined as committing the crime, but also based on the behavior of the social control agents 
including ethical, learning, and moral bases. Meaning of the presumption-of-innocence principle and it inherent 
characteristics are determined by how the legislation is drafted and executed. This viewpoint is certainly going to 
change the perception about the presumption-of-innocence principle which usually viewed from the perspective 
of textual legalistic, so such principles will be seen in the whole context of meaning process of law enforcement 
process as one of the forms of law containing the just and civilized humanity values. 
As an illustration of the criticism include tracing the origin of birth of the presumption-of-innocence 
concept. Origin of the concept will bring an interpreter to find individualistic aspect of the principle in question. 
The Individualistic aspect is what underlies the protection of the rights and interests of offenders (Offender-
based protection) and ignores the protection of collective (community’s) rights and interests who suffered losses 
because of the crime. Concept of the presumption-of-innocence in legislative provisions does not put equal 
protection on the two subjects, namely a law offender and a victim, and consequently, it gives rise to an ongoing 
dialectical reaction about the importance of the "Human Rights and Responsibilities" concept (Atmasasmita, 
2011). However, do the cultural and social roots of the Indonesian nation want such unequal protection of human 
rights? This is a question that must be scrutinized in relation to the implementation of presumption-of-innocence 
principle in question. 
While history is traced, the second principle of Pancasila actually has described the historical record of 
preferred human rights, namely just and civilized humanity, not merely individualistic one. Soekarno declared 
substantively in Suluh Indonesia Muda (Iwan Siswo, 2014) that this is the philosophical principle called 
'internationalism' or 'humanity'. Soon, he emphasized that the internationalism does not mean’cosmopolitanism’ 
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that rejecting nationality. According to Soekarno, the 'nationalism' and 'internationalism' interacts each other; 
Internationalism cannot flourish well if it is not rooted in the earth of nationalism. Nationalism cannot flourish 
well if it is not living in an ‘internationalism’ garden (Latif, 2012). Considering the close relationship between 
nationalism and internationalism, there is a twofold orientation of just and civilized humanity: external (go fight 
for world peace and justice) and 'internal' (glorify human rights, as an individual and a group). Furthermore, the 
fourth paragraph of Preamble of 1945 Constitution contains two important things. First, it brings in humanitarian 
issues to the goals of the state within the framework of fulfilling happiness and collective and individual 
(implicit) rights in national and international life. Second, it anchors humanitarian issues on the state’s 
foundation, especially second foundation, the 'just and civilized humanity' principle (Latif, 2012). 
In the Great Meeting of July 15
th
 1945, Soekarno asserted that as the draft of Constitution Preamble is 
approved, it means that members of the Meeting agreed that foundation, philosophy, and system of the drafting 
of the Constitution are kinship (mutual help). By "approving the social justice words in the Preamble" means that 
"we protest very seriously against the individualism base". Therefore, according to him, independent states 
should include in their Constitution of what so-called 'les droits de I’home et du citoyen' or 'the rights of the 
citizens', Indonesia will make its own choice. "Accordingly, if we really want to base our country to the 
principles of kinship, mutual help, and social justice, then we should wipe away every thought and every idea of 
individualism and liberalism” (Latif, 2012). According to Supomo, a country with kinship principle is not meant 
that there is no guarantee for the basic rights of individuals, but it calls for citizens to put forward the fulfillment 
of obligations rather than demanding their rights. He said, "In the kinship system, citizen’s attitude is not the one 
who always asks 'what are my rights?' But an attitude of questioning; what my obligations as a member of a 
large family, the country of Indonesia? ... this is an idea that we should always remember” (Latif, 2012; Kusuma, 
2004). 
Most of the basic rights contained in the 1945 Constitution are the fundamental right of citizens. This 
indicates that the recognition of human rights is put in a family atmosphere. For the sake of collective benefit, 
the rights granted to citizens are also intertwined with their obligations on the collective interest. This is, among 
the others, seen in Article 27, paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution, "All citizens are equal before the law and 
government and shall obey the law and the government without any exception". Based on this fact, the state of 
Indonesia based on the 1945 Constitution is neither an integralistic state that weakening individual nor a liberal 
one that weakening the collectivity. Indonesia is a family-based country respecting the rights of citizens and 
human beings generally, as individual or in group. 
Article 28 J of the 1945 Constitution and its amendments also asserted that 'in the implementation of 
these rights, every person is obliged to respect the human rights of others in orderly life of society, nation, and 
state'. Also, it has been asserted in the article that, 'every person shall be subject to restrictions set forth by the 
law which is solely to ensure recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others, and to meet fair 
demands that are appropriate to the considerations of morality, religious values, security and public order in a 
democratic society' (Siswoyo, 1983). 
Furthermore, if the idea above is connected with the principle of "due process of law" which had been 
born two hundred years ago in England and developed rapidly in legal system of the United States (Anglo-
Saxon), then in fact, the conception of the presumption-of-innocence principle has been not agreeing, since its 
early birth, with social system of the Indonesia nation. Implicitly moreover, from the standpoint of 1945 
Constitution, the principle contains a 'contradictio in terminis’ character because, in addition to containing "fair 
and as impartial trial" principle for the suspect/defendant, it also contains the "unfair and partial trial" principle 
for the victim of crime (Atmasasmita, 2011). Such principle of "presumption-of-innocence" is very difficult to 
accept by legal logic, especially when dealing with a crime  that have widespread and systematic impact with 
remarkable physical and immaterial victims quantitatively ,such as the cases of corruption committed by 
corruptors. 
Based on the critique above, the dismantle of the principle offers an alternative to open and destroy the 
norms which are usually become the prison in interpreting textually an sich text. In this case, as a logical 
consequence of Indonesian criminal justice system which dominated by crime control model that using the 
‘presumption-of-guilt’ principle in the proceedings, cannot be opposed with the presumption-of-innocence. H.L. 
Packer stated explicitly that it is erroneous if the presumption-of-guilt considered a contrary to the presumption-
of-innocence. Although they are different, they cannot be contested in proceedings (Widjojanto & Moh. Mahfud 
MD, et al., 2012). This is a new idea with nuance of critique about dismantle that is non-binary and should be 
embodied by law enforcers as an institution that is not only pursuing legitimacy but rather the competence. 
It can be described further that the 'presumption-of- innocence' principle is a direction for law 
enforcers on how they should go further and rule out 'the presumption-of-guilt' in their behavior towards the 
suspects. In essence, the 'presumption-of-innocence' is a legal normative in character and not final-result oriented. 
While the presumption-of-guilt is a descriptive factual, means that it based on the available facts that a suspect 
will eventually be found guilty. Therefore, a legal process against him should be conducted starting from stage of 
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inquiry, investigation, prosecution until trial. It should not be terminated in the middle of the road (Hiariej E. O., 
2002). 
It should be understood that the criminal justice system of Indonesia does not strictly adhere to one 
particular model. Despite the tendency is a crime control model, but in reality it is combined with other models. 
For example, the presumption-of-innocence principle is still a normative legal basis for law enforcers when 
investigating a suspect. This means that the suspect is treated as an innocent person. But, on the other hand, 
formally the Criminal Code states in Article 17 that arrest and detention are performed against a person who 
allegedly committed a crime (presumption-of-guilt). This means that police, prosecutor, and the Corruption 
Eradication Commission, based on the factual description, should be sure that the person being investigated or 
indicted that he or she is the real perpetrators (Hiariej E. O., 2005). Therefore, the presumption-of-guilt principle 
is more likely in stages of investigation and prosecution with respect to the rights of the suspect/defendant, while 
the presumption-of-innocence one is at the trial leading to the judge's decision. 
In this case, it must be recognized that dismantle of the text through interpretation is in fact, more of an 
art than merely a game of logic. It means that not textual and single meanings of a text are pursued, but rather, 
the other essence that is more fundamental. In other words, absolute meaning of the text will be destroyed if the 
essence of the text is for justice. The justice can only be achieved through creativity because justice has a plural 
meaning (chaotic) rather than a single, textual meaning (Salman & Susanto, 2004). 
Through the process of dismantling to the justice stage, the interpreter will be enlightened when he or 
she is performing interpretation, because interpretation is a complex process, not only because of meaning of the 
text, but also position of the interpreter as a very complex individual. The dismantling that is reaching domain of 
progressive meaning underlying a principle is an alternative removing the text alienation from reality.  
 
3. Conclusion 
Based on the description of the study’s focus, the reform of legal substance of the presumption-of-innocence 
principle in reality of law enforcement includes two aspects. The first substantial reform includes criticism 
against textual legitimacy of the presumption-of-innocence with its individualistic liberal. The second substantial 
reform is an attempt of dismantling the presumption-of-innocence toward the meaning interpretation containing 
values of just and civilized humanity. 
Actually, the both substantial reforms were trying to uncover inequality relationship between the state, 
represented by law enforcers, and all aspects of power, to the public as victim of a crime in implementation of 
the presumption-of-innocence principle. The dismantling of the presumption-of-innocence principle in the 
textual legal thought which is viewed as a product of law that was a reliable source to legitimize power was tried 
to be questioned. Historical reality of rules in perspective of textual law which, in this case, is seen narrowly as a 
means of social control was sought for. Finally, the proposed substantial reform led to a historical reality that the 
presumption-of-innocence principle with its liberal individualistic character was not agreeing with the 
conception of human rights contained in the second principle of Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution’s Preamble as 
well as in articles of the 1945 Constitution. 
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